A
Free Market Would Avoid Blackouts
Now
By
George
Reisman
California is
reportedly faced with the prospect of thirty days of rolling blackouts
this summer, along with all of the accompanying chaotic consequences.
There is a very simple, free-market method of preventing these impending
blackouts: namely, raise the price of electric power. As the price
of power rises, the quantity of it demanded falls. All that need be done
to avoid blackouts is to raise the price to the extent necessary to reduce
the quantity of electric power demanded to the point that it will be
within the limit of the ability to supply electric power. Then there will
be no blackouts.
What
prevents the public and politicians from supporting this very simple and
straight-forward free-market solution is their fear of how high the price
of power would have to be before the necessary reduction in quantity
demanded would be achieved. In particular, they look at the enormous
prices of electric power that have existed in the wholesale market in
California over the last six months or so and fear correspondingly high
prices in the retail market. And, indeed, following the customary method
of basing the retail price of power on its cost of delivery, the retail
price would, for a very short time, be correspondingly high.
What
hardly anyone realizes, however, is that the enormously high price of
power in the wholesale market is a direct consequence of the retail
price of power being set too low. The low retail price of power allows
the quantity of power demanded to be large enough to require the use of
extremely high-cost sources of supply to meet it. In fact, in such
circumstances, the price may far exceed the costs of the very highest cost
producer able to be in the market. If, however, the retail price of power
were higher and thus the quantity of power demanded were lower, the
resulting smaller supply of power that would need to be generated would be
generated at a sharply lower cost and thus at a sharply lower
wholesale price.
At
the same time, in a free market, the supply of power generated at relatively
reasonable wholesale prices, from power plants already in existence, would
be substantially larger than it now is. In part, this would happen
precisely as the result of the retail price of power being higher. This
would give the power companies the means of paying various suppliers they
have ceased to be able to pay because of retail price controls having
served simultaneously to restrict their revenues while sharply increasing
their costs and thus driving them toward insolvency. Suppliers who now do
not provide power, out of fear of not being paid, would once again supply
power, because they would be paid.
In
addition, a relaxation of environmental controls would also significantly
increase the supply of power available from existing power plants. At
present, there are plants that do not operate as often or to the extent
they might, and in some cases do not operate at all, because of such
controls. Certainly, all but the most misanthropic environmentalists
should agree that there is major room for relaxing such controls at least
for the duration of the looming summer power emergency.
The
power crisis is not the result of "deregulation." No one can
really believe that the power companies were deregulated and then chose to
impose price controls on the power they sold while paying higher and
higher prices for the power they bought. The power crisis is the result of
government controls, most obviously, its control over the retail price of
power, but also its protracted refusal to allow the construction of
sufficient new power plants.
The
crisis has been worsened by the government’s refusal to allow retail
power prices to rise immediately in conjunction with the rising wholesale
price. This has allowed the quantity of power demanded to go on rising and
thus to cause the wholesale price of power to go on rising. It has also
driven electric utilities into bankruptcy or to the verge of bankruptcy
and impaired the State of California’s credit rating, as the result of
its stepping in to buy power in the wholesale market once the utilities’
ability to go on doing so had been exhausted.
The
solution to the power crisis is not to expand the power of the government
by having it take over the assets of the utilities it has almost
destroyed, but to establish for the first time a free market in
power.
The
process should begin with an immediate sharp increase in retail power
rates and relaxation of environmental controls. Because the government’s
bungling has driven wholesale power prices far higher than they would have
needed to go in a free market, it is probably not necessary to raise the
price of all the power sold at retail to the point of corresponding to
these higher wholesale prices.
Homeowners
and apartment dwellers could be allowed to purchase some minimum of
electricity at prices increased to a lesser, though still substantial
extent. But the price of all power beyond that minimum should reflect the
higher wholesale prices. The result would be a significant drop in power
consumption in the following month and thus a lower level of wholesale
power prices in the following month. The further result would be that
retail power prices would be able to start coming down probably after just
this one month. And there would be no blackouts. The worst of the crisis
would be over.
Longer
term, with the government and misanthropic environmentalists out of the
way of the construction of new power plants and of the production of the
fuel and pipelines needed for their operation, the real price of electric
power would be able to resume its historic decline.
In
a free market, everyone involved in electric power production, or energy
production of any kind, indeed, in the production of goods and services of
all descriptions, is motivated to find lower cost methods of production as
the means of increasing his profits. Sooner or later, however, competition
serves to eliminate such increased profits and thus to pass the lower
costs on to the consumers in the form of lower prices. The continuing
quest for premium profits then leads to the discovery and implementation
of still lower cost methods of production, with the same result. The
consequence is progressively falling real prices of everything, including
electric power.
In just this way, the average
American of the year 2000 was enabled to obtain at least ten times the
goods and services, and vastly more than ten times the electric power, as
the average American of the year 1900, even though he worked perhaps only
two-thirds as many hours per week. In other words, forty minutes of his
labor in 2000 gave him wages sufficient to buy the equivalent of what in
1900 required ten hours of his labor. And a very few minutes of his labor
became sufficient give him the wages to buy electric power that would have
required many, many hours of his labor in 1900.
Such wonderful progress in the
ability to buy electricity and all other goods can continue in this new
century, if only power hungry government officials and misanthropic
environmentalists will get out of the way.
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