| |
Galbraith's Neo-Feudalism
By
George Reisman**
|
Material
progress and individual liberty have once again been made the targets of
a crude, sniper attack. In his book,
The Affluent
Society, John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard social commentator,
has indicated that he views with grave displeasure the “sense of
urgency" which is attached to “the craving for more elegant automobiles,
more exotic food, more erotic clothing, more elaborate
entertainment—indeed for the entire modern range of sensuous, edifying,
and lethal desires [sic].”
(p. 140.) He has proclaimed that there are things of greater importance,
such as more public schools, public parks, public roads, and anything
else which “public authority” may deem to be in “relative need.” (pp.
311f.) And he has let it be known that the liberal should cease being “a
co-conspirator with the conservative in reducing taxes." (p. 314.)
Were
it not for the fact that Mr. Galbraith and his followers will exercise
considerable power and influence in the new [Kennedy] Administration,
there would be no purpose in discussing the ideas of this man. For as a
thinker, Mr. Galbraith is not overly distinguished. His procedure is to
combine an immense moral pretentiousness with a rather limited
understanding of the teachings of the economists. And though he depicts
himself as a daring innovator writing in defiance of an overwhelmingly
hostile intellectual environment, his practical position is in essence
no different from that of the typical leftist club-woman; nor has it
been for quite some time. However, the recent Democratic victory at the
polls means that the attempt will be made to implement policies based on
the theories of Mr. Galbraith; and, therefore, his ideas bear closer
examination.
The
thesis of The Affluent Society
is a variant of the Marxian dialectic. Our social morals, economic
science and political institutions are, in Galbraith’s eyes, the
products of an age of scarcity. When men had to contend with cold and
hunger, when they had to devote all of their energies to securing their
bare, physical survival, production was of paramount importance. It was
natural, therefore, that productivity and industriousness should be
regarded as virtues, while anything which reduced the supply of goods in
the hands of private individuals, such as taxes, should be considered an
evil. Thus, Galbraith explains, the businessman and business efficiency
were held in high esteem, while the government was viewed with suspicion
and forced to bear the burden of proof for the need of every tax dollar;
every transfer of resources from private individuals to the government
required a specific, affirmative act of the legislature.
Now,
however, the underlying economic reality has changed, leaving behind an
outmoded political and ideological superstructure which Galbraith calls
“the conventional wisdom." For, in America, at least, we have reached an
age in which "affluence is rendering the old ideas obsolete . . . ." (p.
143.) In the future, it will be college professors and government
officials, not businessmen, to whom the public will grant prestige. (pp
184ff., pp. 194f.) And what is required fiscally is “a system of
taxation which automatically makes a pro rata share of increasing income
available to public authority for public purposes. The task of public
authority, like that of private individuals, will be to distribute this
increase in accordance with relative need. Schools and roads will then
no longer be at a disadvantage as compared with automobiles and
television sets in having to prove absolute justification." (pp. 311f.)
What
is Galbraith
saying? Stripped of the veneer of
pseudo-scientific disinterestedness, he is blatantly arguing for the
institution of a modern brand of Prussian feudalism! It is possible that
he himself is unaware of this. For he imagines that somewhere, off in
the stratosphere as it were, there are private individuals, “public
authority," “increasing income," and “relative need." In his eyes, it is
a question of mere technical expediency whether “increasing income" is
to accrue to private individuals or to “public authority"; in either
case, it will be distributed in accordance with “relative need."
Affluence now dictates that a pro rata share of “increasing income"
accrue to “public authority."
Thus, Galbraith is not for one moment bothered by
such mundane questions as to whom does the "increasing income"
belong,
and whose
“relative need" is to determine its
distribution? There is simply "increasing income” and “relative need.”
The fact that private individuals have produced the goods which
constitute the “increasing income" is not considered a valid reason for
them to determine its disposal. As was the case with the feudal lords of
the pre-capitalist era, “public authority" is to have an unquestioned
claim to a regular share of the fruits of others' industry; it will
distribute the products of others in accordance with what it, and not
they, deems to be in “relative need." And, just as in old Prussia or
Czarist Russia, the servants of public authority—the government
officials and their intellectual flunkies in the tax supported schools
and universities—will have prestige, while the businessman, who supports
them, if not considered vulgar, will be regarded as unimportant.
In
Galbraith's words: “To the extent that problems of military defense,
foreign policy, agricultural administration, public works, education,
and social welfare are central to our thoughts, so the generals, foreign
service officers, administrators, teachers, and other professional
public servants are the popular heroes." (p. 184.)
The
chain of reasoning by which Galbraith proceeds from the existence of
affluence to advocacy of an irresponsible “public authority" having
arbitrary power to spend a pro rata share of the increasing income of
the individual is somewhat involved. He begins by citing the law of
diminishing marginal utility, according to which the importance an
individual attaches to the possession of any given quantity of means of
provision diminishes as the total quantity of means of provision at his
disposal increases. Thus, according to the law of diminishing marginal
utility, a man attaches less importance to the possession of a gallon of
water if he has 1000 gallons than he would if he had but ten gallons.
Likewise, an individual attaches less importance to $100 if his wealth
is $10,000 than he would if his wealth were but $5,000.
Galbraith, in defiance of the most explicit
testimony on the part of the leading theorists of marginal utility (see
the works of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, and, Wieser), would have his readers
believe that economics as a science has tried to hide the
fact
that the marginal utility of wealth in general as well as that that of
particular goods diminishes. (Chap. X.) And after overcoming the straw
man of an incorrect version of the marginal utility theory, and showing
that it must apply to wealth in general as well as to particular goods,
he draws two totally unwarranted, conclusions:
(1)
He infers from the law of diminishing marginal utility, as applied to
wealth in general, that the acquisition of wealth becomes progressively
less important as the amount of wealth increases. Here he makes an
enormous equivocation between the importance of a
concrete amount
of wealth as the total amount of wealth
increases and the importance of
acquiring
wealth as its total amount increases. For while
the importance of the former diminishes with the increase in the amount
of wealth, the importance of the latter does not. The very purpose of
acquiring wealth and the source of the importance of so doing consist
precisely in the
reduction
of the marginal utility of wealth. The
achievement of a progressively lower marginal utility of wealth is one
of the main goals of every rational individual. For the ability to
achieve an ever lower marginal utility of wealth is identical with the
ability to make an ever greater and more complete provision for the
maintenance and enhancement of one’s life and wellbeing. It was the
desire to be able to reduce the importance attached to bearskins, animal
bones, and caves which brought man out of the depths of savagery; and it
was the desire to be able to reduce the importance attached to rags,
breadcrusts, and primitive hovels which brought man to modern
civilization.
Yes,
it is true, bearskins and rags no less than the “more erotic clothing"
of modern times afford protection against the cold; it is true, animal
bones and breadcrusts no less than the “more exotic food" of our day
provide nourishment; it is true, caves and hovels no less than the
luxurious American homes with air conditioning and swimming pools offer
shelter from the elements. And it is also true that if such a
catastrophe should ever occur and people be forced to choose, they would
attach greater importance to the means of bare, physical survival than
to the qualitative differences which distinguish the products of modern
industry from those of primitive toil. But does this mean that man
should have stayed in the cave, or have stopped upon reaching the hovel
? And does it mean that he should rest content with what he has today?
Are life and productive achievement to give way to a passive stupor,
merely because one has a full belly and is no longer at the mercy of
wind, rain, and cold?
(2)
Galbraith's second inference is that the reduced marginal utility of
wealth is an argument for the enlargement of the role of the government
in satisfying the wants of consumers. This conclusion in no way follows.
For not only are the services of the government fully as much subject to
diminishing marginal utility as everything else, a point which he seems
to overlook, but they are also always of
lower
marginal utility than the alternative private
goods and services. If people must be
forced
to pay for them under the threat of a jail term
for non-payment of taxes, that is the proof. In fact, however,
Galbraith's argument is not based on the law of diminishing marginal
utility, but only appears to be.
Not
diminishing marginal utility, but the alleged determinism of advertising
is the cornerstone of his argument. For the proof he offers of the
unimportance of production is the fact that had they not been
advertised, there would have been no demand for a great many of the
products now being produced. Without advertising and salesmanship to
“contrive a sense of want for them, he declares, the marginal utility of
such products would have been zero. (p. 160. |
If goods
which require advertising and salesmanship satisfy only “contrived”
wants, what then is Mr. Galbraith's standard by which goods satisfy
legitimate, non-"contrived" wants ? Apparently, his standard is that the
buyers must know precisely what they want and precisely from whom to
obtain it without the benefit of advertising and salesmanship. “A man
who is hungry need never be told of his need for food. If he is inspired
by his appetite, he is immune to the influence of Messrs. Batten,
Barton, Durstine & Osborne. The latter are effective only with those who
are so far removed from physical want that they do not already know what
they want. In this state alone men are open to persuasion." (p. 158.)
The
absurdity of this standard is immediately evident. If a man is suffering
from pneumonia, need he never be told of his need for penicillin? If a
man desires to travel, need he never be told of the existence of
automobiles, airplanes, railroads, and steamships and from whom they or
their services are available? If a man desires artificial light, need he
never be told of the existence of electricity and electric lights and
where to obtain them? Or if he is hungry, need he never be told of the
hundreds of different kinds of food and where to come by them ? Or must
men be born with a knowledge of all these things and where to acquire
them, before they can be considered to satisfy non-"contrived" wants?
Indeed, advertising and salesmanship do bring about
the desire for goods. More than that, they are even responsible for
giving to what would otherwise be mere
things,
the very character of
goods.
For in order for a thing to become a good,
three conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must it satisfy a human
need, but also one must,
know
that it satisfies one's need, and one must have
disposal
over it. Advertising and salesmanship provide
the knowledge that it does satisfy a human need and where to obtain
disposal over it. Needs are original with the buyers; advertising and
salesmanship transform needs into desires for concrete goods by
providing knowledge: knowledge of what things satisfy the various needs
and where to obtain them.
Again, it is the doctrine of the determinism of
advertising which is the basis for his conclusion that the role of the
government in satisfying the wants of consumers must be expanded.
For
not only does advertising compel people to buy the products which are
advertised, but also, he alleges, it inevitably tends to prejudice the
consumer in favor of private goods and services, even in his capacity as
a voter. The result is that “ . . public services will have an inherent
tendency to lag behind." (pp. 260f.) And it is this which explains why
“The family which takes its mauve and cerise, air-conditioned,
power-steered, and power-braked automobile out for a tour passes through
cities that are badly paved, made hideous by litter, blighted buildings,
billboards, and posts for wires that should long since have been put
underground.” And why “They picnic on exquisitely packaged food from a
portable icebox by a polluted stream and go on to spend the night at a
park which is a menace to public health and morals.” Hopefully, “Just
before dozing of on an air mattress, beneath a nylon tent, amid the
stench of decaying refuse, they may reflect vaguely on the curious
unevenness of their blessings." (p. 253.)
Rarely has such sophistry been employed in an
attempt to evade the obvious. Indeed, the material blessings of
Americans are uneven, and Galbraith is correct when he says: “The line
which divides our area of wealth from our area of poverty is roughly
that which divides privately produced and marketed goods and services
from publicly rendered services." (p. 251.) But is the reason that
advertising causes a voter bias against appropriating funds for
government services, or that government
services are provided by individuals using tax
revenues, individuals who will make no profit if they are successful,
and who will suffer no loss of their own capital if they are
unsuccessful? Does the solution lie in devoting still more wealth to an
institution inherently unfit to be a producer, the government, or is it
not time to ask whether the roads, parks, and sanitation services should
not be run on the same principles which have proved so successful in the
manufacture of automobiles, food, refrigerators, air mattresses, and
nylon tents?
Moreover, is the concept of bias applicable in
explaining the voters’ reluctance to appropriate funds for public
schools and public parks etc., at the expense of such things as
television sets and “erotic clothing?" “The voters" comprise many
millions of particular, individual voters. And it is just possible that
part of the explanation may lie in the fact that a man prefers
his
television set to finger-painting materials for
someone else's
children, or that a woman prefers
her
new dress to a tree in some park which she herself
will rarely or perhaps never visit. Is it a matter of bias for a man to
be more concerned with
his
family's entertainment than with the education of
someone else’s
children or for a girl to be more
concerned with
her own
appearance than with the appearance of some
town’s landscape? It may come as a great shock to Mr. Galbraith: not
only are there things of greater importance than “the community’s
schools and parks,” but the decision as to what is important to whom is
not his to make!
Is
there anything at to Galbraith's claim that advertising causes a voter
bias in favor of private goods and services, and thus an inherent
tendency for public services to lag? The empirical evidence is
overwhelmingly against him. Our armed forces, after all, are no longer
provided with muskets, but with rockets and hydrogen bombs. And never
before has the government had at its disposal so much revenue, both
absolutely and relatively, for its various social projects. If anything
is true, it is that voters today have a bias
against
privately produced goods and services and that
expenditure for public services, far from having a tendency to lag, has
shown a remarkable tendency to increase!
Galbraith's doctrine of the determinism of
advertising suffers from a number of other serious shortcomings. For if
it were true that advertising determined one to buy, how could the
choices consumers make among numerous highly advertised products be
explained? How could the fact that people still buy unadvertised
products be explained when there are close substitutes which are
advertised, as in the case of fresh versus canned vegetables? And how is
it possible for Mr. Galbraith to avoid being biased by advertising in
the same manner as he alleges the voters to be? By what mysterious means
are Mr. Galbraith and “public authority" enabled to rise above the
alleged causal forces acting on lesser mortals?
And,
finally, even if advertising were deterministic, it must never be
forgotten what Mr. Galbraith's alternative is: In the place of the
television cartoon and radio voice causing people to prefer private
goods and services, he proposes to substitute the tax collector and the
whole apparatus of informers, police, jailers and prisons; this will
ensure that people will prefer public services. The choice he offers
must be made explicit: The alleged determinism of the billboard and
poster, or the determinism of the gun and club.
The
overwhelming anti-democratic implications of this position cannot be
ignored, even if Mr. Galbraith does not pursue them. For what does it
mean to. say that the voters are determined (p. 260) while “public
authority" and, to be sure, Mr. Galbraith are not? This is nothing but
the assertion that he and his friends have the right to make decisions
without the consent of the voters, because he and they alone, being
exempt from determinism, are in a position to make rational decisions.
Though he has much in common with them, Galbraith is
not simply a modern “liberal” or do-gooder. For modern “liberalism” is
still characterized by a high degree of secularism, while Galbraith is
openly and consistently “anti-materialistic." In spite of this, however,
it may appear to the reader of
The Affluent Society that Galbraith does base his program
on some concept of the individual's happiness on earth, even if
reserving to himself the right to lay down wherein that happiness is to
be pursued. But this is highly doubtful. For on a number of occasions
the mask begins to slip.
The
first doubts arise when he advances his arguments on diminishing
marginal utility, and then in Chapter XI, when economic activity is
compared to the purposeless motion of a squirrel trying to keep abreast
of a wheel which is propelled by its own movement. (p. 154, p. 159.)
And, earlier in the same chapter, when he compares modern desires for
goods to artificially cultivated demons called into being by the goods
themselves, and asks if the solution lies with more goods or fewer
demons. (p. 153.) This smacks very heavily of the Oriental, mystical
view of man. The fact that life requires continuous action to maintain
it, that happiness requires continuous progress and improvement, and
that no matter how much one has already done, there is still more to do,
is looked upon as pointless, and the proposal made that instead, one do
nothing.
In
Chapter XII, he says something truly remarkable. For there, packed
between page upon page of prattle about the importance of more public
schools and more public recreational and cultural opportunities, we find
that they too appear on the list of “nonessentials,” along with the
restaurants, cafes, garages, and movie theaters. This occurs in his
discussion of the great allied bombing raid on Hamburg during three
nights of July, 1943. “On these three nights of terror their [the
inhabitants of Hamburg] standard of living, measured by house-room,
furnishings, clothing, food and drink, recreation, schools and social
and cultural opportunities, had been reduced to a fraction of what it
had been before." (p. 162.) Is this a disaster of the most enormous
proportions? Not for Galbraith. For, he concludes: “In reducing, as
nothing else could, the consumption of nonessentials and the employment
of men in their supply, there is a distinct possibility that the attacks
on Hamburg increased Germany's output of war material and thus her
military effectiveness." (p. 163.)
Thus, in the last analysis, the only thing really
essential, according to Galbraith, is the military effectiveness of the
state. Everything else is “nonessential.”
And,
finally, in perhaps what is the most amazing slip of all, in his
advocacy of the arbitrary spending power of “public authority,"
Galbraith is on the verge of suggesting that individuals ought to be
made to prove their need for things before being allowed to buy them:
“But with increasing income, resources do so accrue [automatically] to
the private individual. Nor when he buys a new automobile out of
increased income is he required to prove need. We may assume that many
fewer automobiles would be purchased than at present were it necessary
to make a positive case for their purchase. Such a case must be made for
schools." (p. 311.)
One must wonder if what Galbraith is really advocating is
not simply state power as an end in itself and individual deprivation
both as an end in itself and as a means of demonstrating the power of
the state. The possible suffering which such a man may inflict on the
American people, once having achieved a position of power or influence,
is unspeakable. For he seems to combine the mentality of a dictator with
a total contempt for the individual. |
Copyright © 2006 by George Reisman. All rights
reserved.
This article originally appeared in
Human Events
in February of 1961 under the title “Galbraith’s
Modern Brand of Feudalism” and was soon thereafter
reprinted as a pamphlet under its present title.
|
Return to Top of
Page
Go or
Return to the Essays Menu
|
|
|